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Cain v. Price C/W 69889/70864, 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 26 (April 12, 2018)1
CONTRACT LAW: BREACH OF CONTRACT
Summary
The Nevada Supreme Court held that one party’s material breach of contract releases the
non-breaching party’s contractual obligation to a third-party beneficiary.
Facts and Procedural History
Appellants Peggy and Jeffrey Cain, as owners of Heli Ops International, entered into a joint
venture agreement (JVA) with C4 Worldwide, Inc. The JVA stipulated that Heli Ops would loan
$1,000,000 to C4 to obtain and leverage Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (CMOs). In
exchange, Heli Ops would receive the first $20,000,000 in profits resulting from C4’s asset
leverage, while retaining a 49 percent security interest in the CMOs until C4 fulfilled the JVA.
The Cains transferred $1,000,000 to C4, but C4 did not disburse any profits.
Subsequently, the Cains entered into a “Settlement Agreement and Release of All Claims”
with C4 and its CEO. C4 agreed to pay the $20,000,000 to the Cains within ninety days of the
agreement. In return, the Cains agreed to release C4’s officers from liability. However, C4 failed
to pay the Cains by the date stipulated to in the Settlement Agreement. The Cains sued C4 and six
officers, including Price and Shackleford, for breach of the Settlement Agreement, fraud, civil
conspiracy, negligence, conversion, and intentional interference with contractual relations.
The district court awarded default judgment against C4, its CEO, and Price and Shackelford
on all claims for the amount $20,000,000 plus costs. The district court granted summary judgment
because the Settlement Agreement was supported by consideration and the Cains bound
themselves to the release provision. This appeal followed.
Discussion
The district court erred in granting summary judgment because the Cains are not bound by the
Settlement Agreement's release provision
The Cains argued that summary judgment was inappropriate for two reasons. First, the
Settlement Agreement (and release provision) was invalid. Second, if the Agreement was valid,
then C4’s material breach released the Cains from the obligation not to sue C4’s officers. Upon de
novo review, the court agreed summary judgment was improper.
The Settlement Agreement was a valid contract
The Cains contended that the Settlement Agreement did not release Price or Shackelford
from liability because the Agreement was invalid for lack of consideration. They argued that the
Agreement did not provide them consideration in exchange for the release of liability because the
Agreement only acknowledged C4’s preexisting duty to pay the Cains $20,000,000. The Court
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disagreed, finding consideration by removing a condition precedent in exchange for payment. If a
party’s promise differs from one already promised, sufficient consideration is present.
Here, the JVA stated C4 would pay the Cains the first $20,000,000 in proceeds and profits.
Implicit in that statement is that C4 must profited $20,000,000 for the Cains to receive the money.
Thus, earning $20,000,000 was a condition precedent to C4 paying the Cains that amount.
However, the Settlement Agreement removed the precedent and demanded C4 to pay by a specific
date. Eliminating the condition precedent constitutes enough consideration to enforce the
Agreement. The district court was correct to find the Settlement Agreement valid.
C4's breach of the Settlement Agreement releases the Gains from their obligation under
that Agreement
The Cains further argued that the Agreement does not release Price and Shackelford from
liability even if the Agreement was valid. The district court erred by finding the Cains bound
themselves to the Settlement Agreement when they declined to rescind that Agreement and instead
sought damages from C4. The Cains were excused from contractual obligations and entitled to
damages due to C4’s breach. C4 promised the Cains $20,000,000 in exchange for the promise to
release C4’s officers from liability; however, C4 breached said promise. Accordingly, the Cains
were released from their promise not to sue because of the breach.
The problem here is that the district court stated that the Cains honored the Settlement
Agreement by enforcing the default judgment. The district court erroneously interpreted the
$20,000,000 default judgment to be an order for specific performance. However, the Cains never
asked for specific performance. Instead, when the district court granted the default judgment, it
granted the Cains damages. The order for damages, however, did not bind the Cains to the
Settlement Agreement. Thus, C4’s breach of the Settlement Agreement relieved the Cains from
any obligation to Price and Shackelford. The Court overruled summary judgment to Price and
Shackelford and vacated the award of attorneys fees for initially prevailing on the matter.
The district court abused its discretion when it denied the Cains' motion to compel discovery of
Price and Shackelford's personal financial documents
Following the motion to compel discovery of Price and Shackelford’s financial documents,
the district court found that the Cains presented insufficient evidence for fraud to support a claim
for punitive damages; therefore, discovery was inappropriate. Here, the Court reviews whether a
district court has applied the proper legal standard de novo.
Due to the sensitive nature of financial information, the plaintiff must prove sufficient facts
to support a claim for punitive damages.2 To succeed on a claim for punitive damages in contracts
case, the plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant was guilty of
“oppression, fraud, or malice.”3 The Cains presented evidence showing that their loan proceeds
were not being used to purchase CMOs, but were instead used to pay C4’s officers. This alleged
misuse of loans is enough to constitute factual basis to support the claims and render discovery
proper. The district court erred by denying the discovery of Price and Shackelford’s personal
finances.
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The Cains' remaining claims are without merit
The Cains asserted the district court abused discretion when it resolved issues of personal
jurisdiction and alter ego in a pretrial evidentiary hearing. The Court disagreed. Furthermore, the
Cains argued that reversing summary judgment also requires reversing other post-judgment orders,
such as the $9,514 in litigation sanctions for serving subpoenas to Price and Shackelford after the
case was dismissed. The Court affirmed the sanction.
Conclusion
Absent exceptions, one party’s material breach of contract discharges the non-breaching
party’s duty to perform under that contract. Here, C4’s failure to pay the Cains $20,000,000
released the Cains from the promise not to hold C4’s officers liable. The Court reversed summary
judgment and remanded the case to district court for further proceedings.
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